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I INTRODUCTION 
The ocean is one of the world's largest and most important resources . Its 
recycling, cleansing and resource producing abilities have sustained mankind for 
millennia. These functions are coming under increasing pressure from modem 
practices and usages enabled through the evolution of technology. An example of 
this is the relatively recent emergence of the deep-sea or bottom trawling industry. 
This industry has been made possible through advances in technology. This allows 
fishers to trawl the sea floor at depths of up to 2000 metres, although bottom trawling 
is generally defined as trawling below 400-500 metres. It involves dragging heavy 
nets, rollers, and dredges across the seafloor, herding the fish between the top of the 
net and the bottom of the trawl. This means that the trawl gear rolling across the 
seabed can and does destroy formations, such as coral reefs, in its path. This fishing 
practice has become highly controversial, and consequently a prominent marine issue. 
Although this practice affects both national and international waters the principal 
concern is the high seas. Here there is little regulation and no body solely responsible 
for implementing and enforcing any controls.
1 There is urgent need for regulation, as 
this industry is showing signs of expansion, with increasing amounts of exploratory 
fishing in many areas. 
2 This need is supported by scientific evidence concerning this 
topic. Four issues that raise this need for regulation on an ecological basis are; the 
unsustainable nature of bottom trawling; the issue of by-catch; the damage to the 
habitat; and, biodiversity loss. 
3 In addition to these scientific issues, I will briefly 
consider some ethical problems that also suggest the need for regulation. 
1 UNCLOS (10 December 1982) 1836 UNTS 3, art 87 (e).The default position is freedom of fishing 
on the high seas. Contrary to this is the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which sets up state 
jurisdiction over the sea and its resources within 200 miles from the coast. 
2 M. Gianni "High Seas Bottom Trawl Fisheries and their Impact on the Biodiversity of Vulnerable 
Deep-Sea Ecosystems" (IUCN, WWF, Natural resources Defence Council (NRDC), Conservation 
International (CI) (2004) pp 52. He notes that Spanish, Norwegian, Russian, New Zealand, Australian 
and Chilean fleets have engaged in exploratory fishing. 
3 Lee A Kimball "Deep-Sea Fisheries of the High Seas: The Management Impasse" (2000) 19 IJMCL 
259, 261-2. 
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In order to create and implement regulations, there must be a legal basis from 
which management procedures can be formed. The current legal status of bottom 
trawled areas gives rise to several possible bases for protection and regulation of 
threatened areas. These include the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and 
the non-binding Food and Agricultural Organisation's Code of Conduct for 
responsible fisheries (the FAQ Code of Conduct). Some Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (RFMOs) are also of relevance. 
RFMOs have the potential to play a significant role m establishing bottom 
trawling regulation. Firstly, it is evident that some RFMOs have the ability to regulate 
bottom trawling. Because of their role in regulating many of the current fisheries on 
the high seas, they are the best vehicles through to expand the regulation of bottom 
trawling. Secondly, while some RFMOs have begun to regulate bottom trawling, 
more needs to be done to achieve effective regulation of this industry. For example, 
along with pursuing better regulation by RFMOs, there should be a longer term move 
to develop RFMOs with competency over this area. This latter aim is an extremely 
Jong-term option for regulation. As such, improvement in a shorter period could be 
achieved if present RFMOs adopted existing management tools, such as the 
Commission for Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 
system, as guidelines. Thirdly, RFMOs remain flawed in some aspects. Many 
problems suffered by RFMOs are parallel with those of many international 
organizations. For example, domestic concerns tend to dominate the aims of states, 
rather than what may be best internationally. These problems do not mean that 
RFMOs cannot or will not produce effective results. Even if only some RFMOs 
achieve regulations that have a limited level of compliance, we will be better off 
ecologically than if nothing is done. Fourthly, acknowledgement that RFMO action 
alone has limitations supports the need for parallel development of international 
principles or guidelines to cover this area. These principles could act to provide a 
unification of objectives. Such objectives could be achieved through existing 
agreements, or through development of a new hard or soft law agreement. While 
these two processes have different benefits and drawbacks, I conclude that a soft law 
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instrument would be the most acceptable and practical compromise between use and 
protection of these threatened marine resources. 
II THE NEED FOR REGULATION OF DEEP SEA TRAWLING 
Bottom trawling has been recognized as an unsustainable fishing practice in many 
cases, due both to the nature of the fish it targets and the nature of their habitat. While 
it makes up less than 'one percent of both the production and value of global marine 
capture fisheries' 4 its environmental impact is proportionately higher. This supports 
the conclusion that the 'potential adverse effect on the marine environment of high 
seas bottom trawling outweighs any potential benefit from increased fish catches' .5 It 
is unlikely that any expansion of this industry would justify the larger amounts of 
damage caused. 
High seas bottom trawlers tend to target seamounts. Seamounts are defined as 
underwater structures rising 1000m or more above the surrounding terrain, although 
this term is used to describe include smaller features as well. These seamounts are 
targeted as many deep-water species congregate on these. 6 One concern raised by 
bottom trawling is that scientists believe that the interaction of fish within these 
habitats may affect behavior, reproduction and life cycles of some fish species. 
Damage to seamount habitat may therefore have a direct effect on the sustainability 
of fish populations.7 For these reasons, any regulation of bottom trawling needs to 
take into consideration both its effects on the fish stocks and on their habitat. 
A The Unsustainable Nature of Bottom Trawling 
4 Michael W Lodge "Improving International Governance in the Deep Sea" (2000) IJMCL 299, 300. 
5 Lodge above n 4, 300. 
6 P Keith Probert, Don G McKnight, Simon L Grove "Benthic Invertebrate by-catch from a deep water 
trawl fishery, Chatham Rise, New Zealand" (1997) 7 Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 27, 36; JA 
Koslow, G W Boehlert, J D M Gordon, R L Haedrich, P Lorance, N Parin "Continental slope and 
Deep-sea fisheries: implications for a fragile ecosystem" (2000) 57 ICES Journal of Marine Science 
548,549. 
7 Probert above n 6, 36. 
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Bottom dwelling stocks have several characteristics that make them particularly 
susceptible to over fishing. Vis-a-vis other commercial fish species, they tend to be 
long lived and have a slow life cycle, are slow to come to sexual maturity and do not 
always reproduce every year. 8 Consequently, when seamounts are heavily fished, the 
associated stock can be depleted beyond commercial use within five to ten years as 
stocks cannot replace themselves quickly enough. A pattern known as 'serial 
depletion' has occurred, where seamounts are rapidly fished beyond commercial 
viability, then fishers move on to a new ground and repeat the process.9 This is what 
has happened to orange roughy fisheries in the Southwest Indian Ocean, where 
seamounts have been fished beyond commercial viability and then deserted as a new 
target area was identified. This occurred very rapidly (with in 3-5 years) and the 
damage was done before any regulation could be negotiated. Bottom trawling is 
responsible for about 80 per cent of the catch of bottom dwelling species on the high 
seas. 10 
Studies indicate that bottom trawling is likely to produce the most extreme and 
destructive effects in the deep sea, where a trawled area may take decades to 
recover. 11 In some existing trawled areas, it is not clear whether the stocks will ever 
recover. For example it is unknown whether the stocks of roundnose grenadier in the 
Northwest Atlantic will ever reach levels of commercial sustainability. 12 Generally 
little is known for sure about the effects of intensive bottom trawling on the high seas, 
or what it may mean for sustainable management of deep-sea fisheries. 13 The 
unsustainable nature of many fisheries is not a new problem and regulatory 
techniques to manage this in other situations exist. This means potential systems can 
be modeled on existing systems surrounding other high seas fisheries. The existing 
8 Koslow above n 6, 549 tells us, for example that the life cycle of the orange roughy is estimated to be 
over 100 years long. Additionally they may not come to sexual maturity until they about 20 years old. 
Also see MW Clarke, CJ Kelly, P L Connolly, J P Molloy "A life History Approach to the 
Assessment and Management of Deepwater Fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic"(2003) 31 J Northw Atl 
Fish Sci 401 for studies of specific species. 
9 Gianni above n 2, 54. 
1° Kimball above n 3, 261. The remainder is taken primarily by bottom long line fishing, principally in 
the Southern Ocean around Antarctica. 
11 Probert above n 6, 28. 
12 Clarke above n 8, 402. 
13 Probert above n 6, 28. 
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situation must be remedied, where some of the most vulnerable and unsustainable 
fisheries remain one of the least regulated areas of the high seas. 
B By-catch Problems 
By catch problems in bottom fisheries are not limited to fish, where 
'investigations [show] bottom fisheries increase the mortality of both target and non-
target species but also of benthic species' .14 The affected seafloor species are mainly 
invertebrates like corals and sponges found on the continental slopes, seamounts and 
mid-ocean ridges. 15 The amount of coral bought up by this process is estimated to be 
huge, but is decreasing as deep-sea coral, like deep sea fish, is slow growing and 
long-lived, and is not replenishing itself.16 For example, in the 1997-1998 period, 
observers of the orange roughy bottom trawl fisheries on the South Tasman Rise off 
the coast of Australia reported that there was approximately 1.6 tonnes of coral for 
every hour of towing a trawl net compared to the 2000-2001 period where coral by-
catch had reduced to 0.7 tonnes per hour. 17 This figure did not include the coral that 
would have been damaged but was not bought to the surface. The extent of the by-
catch of coral can be seen when viewing the photographic surveys carried out on 
nearby seamounts on the Northwest Chatham Rise, off the coast of New Zealand. 
Comparing those which had not been trawled where there showed almost 100 per 
cent cover of coral weighed against those that had been which had been trawled, 
which had about 3 percent coral cover. 18 
There is also the problem of by-catch of juveniles and other deep-sea species. A 
further problematic characteristic of bottom dwelling fish is that they tend to have: 19 
14 Catharina JM Phi Iii part "Long-term impact of bottom fisheries on several by-catch species of 
demersal fish and benthic invertebrates in the south-eastern North Sea" (1998) 55 ICES Journal of 
Marine Science 342, 342. 
15 Kimball above n 3, 262. 
16 Koslow above n 6, 554-555. 
17 0 F Anderson, MR Clark "Analysis of the by-catch in the fishery for orange roughy, hoplostethus 
atlanticus, on the South Tasman Rise" (2003) 54 Marine and Freshwater Research 643, 649 table 5. 
18 M Clark, R O'Driscoll "Deep water fisheries and Aspects of their Impact on seamount habitat in 
New Zealand" (2003) 31 J Northw Atl Fish Sci 151, 152. 
19 J D M Gordon "The Rockall Trough, Northeast Atlantic: the cradle of Deep-sea Biological 
Oceanography that is Now Being Subjected to Unsustainable Fishing Activity" (2003) 31 J Northw Atl 
Fish Sci 57, 69. 
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large scales and are not well endowed with mucus so most immature fish or fish of 
small adult size that enter the trawl and subsequently escape through the meshes will 
likely be badly damaged and will probably not survive. 
This type of by-catch problem is described as 'no catch discards' and means that the 
biomass of the fish stock with such physical features will decline even faster, leading 
more quickly to an unsustainable fishery than would be the case for many other 
stocks. 20 Bottom trawling is one of the worst culprits with regards to the by-catch 
issue, it is said to be: 21 
particularly unselective in terms of species caught and has led to high levels of 
discards in commercial fisheries, with an estimated 27 million tonnes of material 
discarded annually in the 1980s and early 1990s, compared with the 100 million 
tonnes or so that are actually landed. 
C Ecosystem and Habitat Destruction 
It has been recognised that trawling has significant impacts on deep-sea 
ecosystems as well as on targeted fish stocks. Both of these destructive outcomes 
were a focus of the fifth meeting of the 2002 United Nations Informal Consultative 
Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS).22 Direct effects of trawling 
include crushing, burying and exposing sensitive ecosystems.23 Bottom trawling has 
been identified as a specific hazard to the reduction of structural diversity of these 
habitats24 and likened to using a bulldozer to weed a garden. 25 A central problem is 
20 Gordon above n 19, 69. 
21 Kai Yin Kwok, Cynthia Yau and I-Hsun Ni "Conservation Aspects of Commercial Fishing" (2002 
nJCN/WCPA-EA-4 Taipei Conference, Taipei , 18-23 March 2002) <http://www.cnps.org.tw> (last 
accessed 02 August 2005) . 
22 Delegation of Norway "Deep-water Habitats Vulnerable to Fishing activities: Closing of Areas for 
Trawling in the Regulatory Area" (2004 NEAFC's 23rd Annual Meeting, London, 8-12 November 
2004) <http://www.neafc.org> ; Lodge above n 4, 299. 
23 Daniel E Duplisea, Simon Jennings, Karema J Warr, Tracey A Dinmore "A size-based model of the 
impacts of bottom trawling on benthic community structure" (2002) 59 Canadian Journal of Fisheries 
and Aquatic Sciences 1785, 1786. 
24 Ocean Studies Board Effects of Trawling and Dredging on Sea floor Habitat National Research 
Council (Washington, 2002) <http://www.nap.edu> (last accessed 20 June 2005). 
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that it is unknown what effects this habitat modification will have on the target fish 
stocks. It is noted that 'habitat alteration by the fishing activities themselves is 
perhaps the least understood of the important environmental effects of fishing'. 26 
Presently there is limited understanding between the interactions and ecology of 
target and non-target species, but studies conducted imply that there is an important 
correlation between deep-sea species and their habitat, in aspects such as lifespan and 
mortality rates. 27 Despite the lack of research, marine and environmental scientists 
recognise that there is need for concern and precautionary action, particularly where 
concentrated bottom trawling is occurring. It is necessary to control and limit the 
effects of bottom trawling on deep-sea ecosystems because we do not know what 
potentially significant alterations to the deep-sea habitat, environment and associated 
communities could occur.28 
D Biodiversity Loss 
Biodiversity loss is a critical issue of bottom trawling due to the highly endemic 
nature of the species that live on these seamounts. Their isolation from disturbance 
has made them extremely vulnerable to extinction, as has their tendency towards 
'extreme longevity'. 29 The Scientists Statement on Protecting the World's Deep-sea 
Coral and Sponge Ecosystems, presented to the 2004 annual meeting of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) describes the damage being 
done to deep-sea species and those of the benthos as 'unprecedented' .30 Biodiversity 
lost to deep-sea trawling is not just important for the sake of being 'diverse'; it can 
provide important information about other aspects of concern. For example, some 
25 Catherine Masters; Michael Richardson "Nets leave a trail of death in the sea" (9 October 2004) 
New Zealand Herald Auckland <http://www.nzherald.co.nz> (last accessed April 6th 2005). 
26 Ocean Studies Board above n 24, Chap 3. 
27 Ocean Studies Board above n 24. Chap 3. For example juveniles will interact and use the habitat for 
firotection from other species. 
8 Probert above n 6, 28, 36. 
29 Bertrand Richer de Forges "Diversity and endemism of the benthic seamount fauna in the south west 
Pacific" (2000) 405 Nature 944,946. 
30 The Scientists Statement on Protecting the World 's Deep-sea Coral and Sponge Ecosystems, 
presented to the 2004 annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS statement), and the United Nations Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) signed at the 
10th Deep Sea Biology Symposium at the Institute of Marine Biology, University of Oregon, in Coos 
Bay, 25-29 August 2003. 
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deep-sea corals can serve as archives on past climate conditions 31 and species 
development, where sampling on a Tasmanian seamount found a group thought to 
have died out in the Mesozoic era. 32 A further potential use is the medicinal 
properties that these species may hold. Some corals have been found to be sources of 
antibiotics, whilst others have pain killing properties and asthma and heart disease 
treatments. 33 There may be yet unknown uses given that 36 percent of species 
discovered on seamounts off the coast of Tasmania were new to science. 34 The 
AAAS, in harmony with the views of many scientists has noted this, and recognized 
that endemism makes seamounts highly vulnerable to fishing activities, and that 
bottom trawling represents 'the greatest human threat' to this deep sea biodiversity.
35 
An issue that complicates regulation of deep-sea trawling is that not all seamounts are 
going to be biologically important and worthy of protection. Because of this, it is not 
viable to aim for a blanket ban on trawling of all seamounts, yet the value of others 
means that they do need protection. Unfortunately we do not know which of these 
will prove valuable until more research has been done thus emphasizing the urgent 
need for more scientific studies of the deep-sea ecosystem. 
E Equity Issues 
In addition to the scientific reasons for regulation of the bottom trawling industry, 
there are also equity considerations. These arise due to the relatively small number of 
states that are engaged in and therefore profiting from this practice and causing the 
associated destruction.36 At the moment 95 percent of this catch is taken by just 11 
countries, the damage caused to global resources is, however, suffered by all states. 
As pointed out above, we do not know what we are destroying. Eleven states are 
31 AAAS Statement above n 36. 
32 Richer de Forges above n 29, 946. 
33 National Marine Sanctuaries, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration "Joint Management 
Plan Review, Proposed Action Plans. A Report to the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary 
Advisory Council" June 2003 <http://www.sanctuaries .nos.noaa.gov> (last accessed 02 August 2005). 
34 Richer de Forges above n 29, 944. 
35 AAAS statement above n 30; Richer de Forges above n 29, 944. 
36 These states are Spain, Portugal, Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Norway, Iceland, Denmark (in 
respect of the Faroe Islands), New Zealand and Japan. <http://www.neafc.org> (last accessed 20
th July 
2005). 
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currently eliminating an estimated 500,000 to 100 million species 37 before such 
knowledge can be acquired, used and shared for the benefit of all. 38 There are several 
possible ways that this equity argument can affect the international regulation of 
bottom trawling. Firstly, it could encourage regulation or imposition of a moratorium 
so that fish stocks remain, and other states do not lose out before they can participate. 
Secondly, it could be cited in support for imposing a moratorium on bottom trawling 
as an inequitable practice. Lastly, it could be invoked to lobby that any international 
regulation around deep-sea trawling has provisions specifying the equitable sharing of 
benefits on similar terms to s 19 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity.39 
III LEGAL BASES ON WHICH REGULATIONS COULD BE 
FORMULATED 
Implementation of regulations around bottom trawling needs to have a legal basis 
from which to develop. There are a number of instruments, both treaties and 
voluntary agreements, which could provide a framework for addressing the regulation 
of bottom trawling at an international level. These include the United Nations 
Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the United Nations Conference on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA), the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries (the FAQ Code). 40 
The need for regulation of bottom trawling is recognised by the international 
community including states, politicians, scientists and environmentalists. It has also 
been recognised by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in its Resolution 
on Oceans and Law of the Sea, adopted in November 2003. This repeats its call for 
'Urgent consideration ... to .. .improve ... the management of risks to the marine 
37 Kristine M Gjerde, David Freestone "Unfinished business: Deep-Sea Fisheries and the Conservation 
of Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction, Editors' Introduction" (2004) 19 IJMCL 209, 
214. 
38 Kimball above n 3, 273, 283-284. 
39 Lodge above n 4, 309. 
40 UNCLOS above n l; UNFSA (04 December 1995) 34 ILM 1542; CBD (5 June 1992) 31 ILM 822, 
FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted by the FAO Conference on 31 October 1995 
<http://www.fao.org> 
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biodiversity of seamounts ... the threats and risks to vulnerable and threatened marine 
ecosystems and biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction'.41 However this 
statement is weak in that it does not make any hard commitments as to how this 
should be done. As such, the following instruments may all contribute to 
development of bottom trawling regulation. 
A United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 1982 
UNCLOS is the basis for all discussion of legal regulation of the manne 
environment as it provides the elementary framework of laws that surround this area 
today. The freedom of fishing granted in article 87 (e) represents the default position 
within UNCLOS. While this freedom is amended in some places, bottom trawling on 
the high seas is not one of those areas. It remains almost completely disregarded 
within UNLCLOS and there is no explicit mention for conservation of high seas 
bottom dwelling species. This is inconsistent with the attention that UNCLOS pays to 
straddling and highly migratory stocks, which are provided for in articles 63 and 64.42 
Indirectly, the conservation provisions in part VII, section two of UNCLOS can 
be read to apply to bottom trawling. This section covers the conservation and 
management of the living resources of the high seas, and places some limits on the 
provision of article 87 (e).Article 116, of section two, reiterates the right for freedom 
of fishing on the high seas, but makes this subject to section two provisions.43 This 
means that the freedom to fish on the high seas is limited by reference to articles 116-
121; however, for the purposes of bottom trawling, the important provisions of 
section two are articles 117-119. The influence of articles 63 and 64 is also important 
for the development of bottom trawling regulation, but as these are expanded and 
further implemented under the UNFSA, their possible impacts are dealt with in that 
paragraph. 
41 UNGA Resolution 58/240 (23 December 2003) A/RES/58/240 paras 51, 52. 
42 UNCLOS above n 1, arts 63, 64. These articles deal with straddling stocks and highly migratory 
stocks respectively. The former requires that 'States shall seek ... to agree upon ... measures necessary to 
ensure ... conservation' whilst art 64 requires State to 'co-operate ... with a view to ensuring 
conservation'. Thus, the latter is clearly a weaker obligation upon states. 
43 UNCLOS above n 1, part VII. Note art 116 (a) to treaty obligations; and, (b) the interests of coastal 
states (including their interrelation with arts 63, and 64). 
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Article 117 requires states to take national measures or co-operate with other 
states to take measures necessary to achieve conservation of living resources of the 
high seas. 44 Article 118 is focused on the duty of states to co-operate towards 
conservation as regards living resources of the high seas. It specifies that states shall 
enter into regional or sub-regional organisations to this end. These provisions form 
the basis for the existence of RFMOs to further the conservation objectives of 
UNCLOS. These provisions therefore oblige states to work nationally and 
internationally towards conservatory measures. Article 119 expands on this duty by 
taking a more comprehensive look at what states should do as regards conservation 
goals. For example, it covers objectives such as keeping or restoring stocks to 
maximum sustainable yield levels. It also sets out conservation measures that states 
should consider when making decisions such as acting on the best scientific 
information available, and taking into account biological, ecological, environmental, 
and economic considerations. 45 For bottom trawling this would mean that states 
should at least be attempting to come to agreements either between themselves or 
through RFMOs to apply such measures. 
Article 119 does not require explicitly that states exercise these duties in 
accordance with the precautionary approach. However, a precautionary approach is 
not ruled out either, as article 119 does not say that scientific proof is needed before 
states should apply such conservation techniques. This means that states can act to 
achieve conservation goals even when 'proof' of problems is not available.46 That 
states should act in this way would be an interpretation consistent with later treaties 
that do include the precautionary principle such as the UNFSA. It would also be 
consistent with the status of the precautionary approach as an emerging norm of 
customary international law. This interpretation is helpful as it could encourage 
states to enact regulation despite not having comprehensive data on, and disagreement 
over, the effects of bottom trawling. 
44 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, A Commentary (The Virginia Commentaries) 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 1995) Yol 3 Section 2: Conservation and Management 
of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 219 para 117 .1. 
45 The Virginia Commentaries above n 44, 305 para 119.1. 
46 The Virginia Commentaries above n 44, 310 para 119.7 (c). 
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Additionally a rudimentary ecosystems approach is provided for in article 119 (1) 
(b). This article requires states to consider effects of conservation measures upon 
species associated with or dependent upon the targeted species. This has the effect of 
'broaden[ing] the obligation of States ... to conserve and manage the living resources 
of the high seas to encompass the conservation of associated and dependent species 
(regardless of their commercial exploitability)' .47 This article can therefore provide a 
basis for looking at the wider effects of bottom trawling to include species other than 
the targeted stock. This is relevant for bottom trawling because, as pointed out above, 
there is evidence that dependence exists between habitat and bottom dwelling stocks. 
However, this 'ecosystem approach' does not impose a strong obligation for states to 
act on, as these interrelationships only have to be 'taken into consideration' .48 
There may be scope for regulation under section XI, article 145 of UNCLOS, 
which covers the regime of the seabed. The conservation measures that could apply 
to bottom trawling can be seen in article 145 (a) and (b). Article 145 (a) states that 
the International Seabed Authority (ISA) should adopt appropriate regulations for the 
'prevention, reduction and control of. .. hazards to the marine environment. . .including 
the ecological balance'. Further to this, article 145 (b) provides for 'the protection and 
conservation of natural resources ... and the prevention of damage to the flora and 
fauna of the marine environment'. This could be seen as acting as a clear mandate for 
the ISA to take a leading role in developing bottom trawling regulations. 
Additionally, these articles would mean that ISA sponsored regulations would have a 
wider approach to conservation than just protecting fisheries, as they would be 
focused on the conservation of the marine environment. However, the ISA has not 
taken any steps towards this, and states that the principal function of the Authority is 
to regulate deep seabed mining.49 
B United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks 1995 
47 The Virginia Commentaries above n 44, 311 para 119.7 (d). 
48 UNFSA above n 40, art 119. 
49International Seabed Authority <http://www.isa.org> (last accessed 21/07 /05) 
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This instrument was designed to cover some of the weaknesses that had become 
increasingly evident with the UNCLOS approach to certain high seas stocks, namely 
those of articles 63, and 64 of UN CLOS. 50 It is clear from the long title of the 
UNFSA5L that it is designed as an extension to the provisions of UNCLOS as regards 
conservation of these stocks coming under serious threat from unsustainable fishing 
practice. As with the bottom trawl issue today, there was a UNCLOS basis for 
conservation for these stocks, but there needed to be a further agreement to 
implement actual conservation measures. 52 The UNFSA could aid development of 
bottom trawling in two ways. Gianni suggests that it can be argued that the UNFSA 
already covers some of the bottom trawled stocks, and can currently impose 
conservation measures, however this is not uncontroversial. Alternatively, the 
UNFSA could indirectly influence bottom trawl regulation by acting as a framework 
for developing a similar agreement for this area. 
The basis for Gianni' s argument is that some of the bottom dwelling stocks can be 
considered to be straddling stocks.53 This will occur when their habitat is spread 
across an EEZ and the high seas, so despite their discrete nature, they straddle the two 
jurisdictions. These 'straddling' stocks would therefore, arguably, be subject to the 
conservation provisions of the UNFSA. Gianni extends this by arguing further that if 
these stocks are covered, it could potentially provide coverage for all deep-sea 
fisheries. This is because even though not all bottom trawling and seamount targets 
would fall into this category of straddling stocks, it would be unjustifiable to treat 
50 Lodge above n 4, 303-304. 
51 United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Agreement 
for the implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982, relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks. 
52 Lodge above n 4, 303-304. It was noted by the Conference on Fisheries (COFI) meeting that 'despite 
perceptions to the contrary, the 1982 Convention together with UNFSA does cover discrete high seas 
stocks as well as straddling and highly migratory stocks' but 'real problems persist in relation to 
discrete high seas fish stocks'. COFI "Moving from Words to Actions" (2005 Conference on the 
Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the UN Fish Agreement, St. John's, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1-5 May 2005) 13 <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fgc-cgp/conf_report_e.pdf> (last accessed 30 
August 2005). 
53 Gianni above n 2, 67-8. In the Northeast Atlantic, the Hatton Bank and the Rockall Plateau, both 
associated with deep sea trawling, straddle EEZ and high seas boundaries. The orange roughy fishing 
grounds on the South Tasman Rise and the Northwest Challenger Plateau could be said to target 
straddling stock as both areas straddle the EEZ's of Australia and New Zealand respectively. 
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those that did better and differently to those which were not covered by the UNFSA.54 
The implication of Gianni 's line of thought is that states party to the UNFSA should 
apply the same measures to species taken by bottom trawling as those applied to 
'normal' straddling stocks. 
Whilst this argument would provide a very convenient means to assert that 
conservation measures of the UNFSA do apply to bottom trawling, any attempt to 
apply this approach is not as easy in practice as Gianni makes it sound in theory. 
Gianni points out that most of the 11 countries currently dominating the bottom 
trawling industry are parties to the UNFSA.55 However, this does not really improve 
the situation as these countries do not necessarily accept the relevance of the UNFSA 
here. Additionally, even if it were to be agreed that some stocks and habitats fall 
within this category and are entitled to UNFSA measures, it is unlikely that this 
would be extended to all straddling habitats. Gianni says that protecting the stock and 
habitats of some seamounts would make it unjustifiable to not do the same to all. 
However, this implies that there are comparable levels of biota and associated stock 
on all seamounts, which, as pointed out earlier, is not so. As such, there are strong 
arguments to support the idea that some seamounts may be trawled, for example, for 
those with fewer or no endemic species, and of low biological importance, it may be 
entirely justifiable to trawl these whilst not trawling other, more diverse seamounts. 
This point has been picked up by the Russian Federation, at NEAFC's 23rd Annual 
Meeting, where they argued the uncertainty of the effect of closures, and said that 'in 
some areas bottom trawling does not affect the bottom fauna adversely, in other areas 
closures have had an adverse effect on the bottom fauna. 56 
This illustrates that even if these countries are prepared to first agree that the 
UNFSA principles do apply, they are still unlikely to extend this unreservedly to all 
seamounts. A further problem, even if this did occur, would be the flag state 
jurisdiction that the UNFSA sets up. This form of enforcement means that any 
54 Gianni above n 2, 67-8. 
55 
Gianni above n 2, 68. The countries which are party to the UNFSA take approximately 90 percent of 
the catch, and include the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Norway, Iceland and the Ukraine. 
56 
NEAFC "Report of the 23rd Annual Meeting of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission" 
(NEAFC Annual Report) (London, 8-12 November 2004). 
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management procedures would add to the already huge task of trying to prevent and 
deter IUU fishing. 
Despite this probable Jack of direct application to bottom trawling management, 
the UNFSA regulatory regime could still be of be of indirect value. It is more likely 
that the UNFSA can be helpful to bottom trawling regulation by acting as a model for 
a similar convention as regards discrete high seas stocks. Another possibility that has 
been proposed is amendment of provisions of the UNFSA to include management of 
discrete stocks as well as straddling and highly migratory stocks. This latter approach 
is also an unlikely prospect, but these two ideas are discussed further under the 
paragraph titled 'development of international regulatory guidelines'. 
C Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 
The CBD, while not placing any restrictive obligations on state's behavior can be 
useful as a guiding document. A main drawback of the CBD is in article 22, which 
makes its provisions subordinate to other treaties. While this is often invoked to 
avoid its provisions, the CBD can be of value in other ways. For example, its main 
principle in article 1 aims for 'the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable 
use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of ... benefits'. 57 This article 
can be utilized as a tool from which to develop similar principles to guide 
development towards regulations covering bottom trawling. This principle, as stated 
in the CBD, is also useful in that it applies to activities within and beyond control of 
national jurisdiction.58 
Direct involvement of the CBD in the issue of bottom trawling took place at the 
seventh Conference of the Parties (COP-7). It was urged by the UNGA to look at the 
threats posed by bottom trawling. It responded by producing a decision which inter 
alia recognised the serious threat to biological diversity posed by bottom trawling and 
called upon the United Nations and other relevant organisations to urgently take 
57 CBD above n 40, art l. 
58 CBD above n 40, arts 3-5. 
15 
short, medium and long term measures. 59 Parties to the CBD have recognised since its 
inception the need for on going scientific research in order to better understand the 
complicated interrelationships that make up ecosystems. Without better 
understanding of ecosystems, we do not know how to better protect them. The 
importance of this is reflected by the fact that the need to acquire, and obligation to 
share information, is one of the few binding obligations that the CBD creates.60 The 
need for knowledge as regards bottom trawling led the CBD, in February 2004, to 
'ask international bodies to co-operate in compiling and synthesizing information 
on ... the seabed ... in areas beyond national jurisdiction, including identifying 
threats ... and technical options for their protection' .61 Thus the CBD is acting in its 
capacity of a conveyer of information about bottom trawling and effects on stocks, 
biodiversity and habitat. 
The CBD does set out important conservation prov1s1ons, for example 
identification of biodiversity components, and guidelines for in-situ conservation.62 
Whilst these do not place obligations on states to act in accordance with them, they 
can be guiding tools for development of new regulations. Broad ratification of the 
principles means that the CBD is an effective international instrument from which to 
draw concepts to help further regulation, which like the UNFSA, could incorporate 
some of its provisions into a more binding regime. 
D FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995 
Unlike the other three international bases for actions which have been discussed 
above, the FAQ Code of Conduct is not a treaty but a voluntary code. However it can 
still be of benefit to the development of bottom trawl regulations for several reasons. 
Firstly it contains conservation principles very similar to the UNFSA, recommending 
59 Decision VIl/5 of the Seventh Conference of the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
on marine and Coastal Biological Diversity <http://www.biodiv.org/decision/default.aspx> (last 
accessed 27 July 2005) 
60 CBD above n 40, arts 7, 12 and 17. 
61 Lodge above n 4, 311. 
62 For example CBD above n 40, article 8 (d) 'promotes the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats 
and maintenance of viable populations of species in natural surroundings' . Also see generally arts 6 to 
10. 
16 
the ecosystem approach to fisheries and application of the precautionary principle. 
Strong similarities can be seen in comparison of the language between the two 
instruments. The FAO Code goes further than the UNFSA to extend requirements of 
conservatory measures to provide a more thorough approach. This can be seen in the 
FAQ code's treatment of the precautionary approach. In the UNFSA it is set out in 
article 6, the FAQ Code adopts the same language in its article 6.5 but also extends 
the concept in later sections to cover how and by whom this approach should be 
implemented.63 
The FAQ code also has the advantage of having been endorsed by all members of 
the FAQ and thus has a much wider scope of coverage than the UNFSA. Its ambit is 
also broader in scope meaning that these principles apply to fisheries that the UNFSA 
does not reach, these include deep sea fisheries , this is shown by article 1 of the Code, 
which provides that it's 'principles and standards [apply] to the conservation, 
management and development of all fisheries' .64 A further beneficial aspect is that 
article 4 provides that the application and implementation of this code will be 
monitored by the FAQ who will report to CQFI. This provides third party monitoring 
by an objective organisation. Whilst the Code is not binding and therefore no action 
can be taken against non-compliers, it can still be useful in that it can report without 
bias about which states are and are not acting consistently with the Code's 
conservation principles. This could act to increase public pressure domestically and 
by the international community to act in a more responsible manner for those who are 
not applying the Code. 
Some of the Code ' s strengths arise out of its weaknesses. The very fact that the 
Code has had such wide sign up is because of its status of soft law and its consequent 
lack of ability to compel action to achieve its stated goals . Conversely, this also 
means that its thorough formulations of important management principles do not 
impose any obligation on states to implement these. As Jong as a state is getting 
benefits from bottom trawling, without breaching obligations, it is likely that it will 
63 Compare the UNFSA above n 40, art 6, which lays down the basis for the precautionary approach, 
with the FAQ Code of Conduct above n 40, arts 6.5, 7 .5 .1 and 7.5.2. The language of the ecosystem 
approach in art 5 of the UNFSA is also duplicated and extended by the FAQ code in articles 6.6, 7 .2.2 
~), 7.6.9 and 8.5, which provide more detail. 
FAQ Code of Conduct above n 40, art 1.3 [emphasis added] . 
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continue. Although some soft law instruments have been successful in changing 
behavior, it is unlikely that states will voluntarily start now to restrict their actions 
based on this non-binding code.65 
The FAQ Code of Conduct does remain valuable, albeit more as a basis for 
further regulation to build upon. It complements and extends the UNFSA, in that 
it provides a more thorough plan of conservation measures and implementation 
guidelines. As a legal base for regulation of bottom trawling, the FAQ Code of 
Conduct is a more appropriate base for a treaty than the UNFSA as it can provide 
a set of conservation standards that can be held to apply to bottom trawling as 
well as other forms of fishing, whilst still taking into account the ecosystem 
approach. 
IV RFMOS: THE VEHICLES FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
RFMQs are the primary vehicles for current management of high seas fisheries 
resources, however despite the range and diversity of these organisations very few 
have the competence to regulate bottom trawl fisheries. 66 Utilizing current RFMQs is 
a practical way forward. RFMOS that currently regulate this area have bases form 
which to develop consistent regulations. Those RFMQs that do not currently regulate 
this area can be developed and their competence expanded more easily than 
development of new organisations. Regulations instated by RFMQs can provide 
actual limits on state behavior. This is unlike the current situation, where little action 
can be taken, as high seas bottom trawling is not currently considered illegal purely 
because it is inconsistent with general international obligations.67 RFMQ regulations 
in place around bottom trawling means there can be actual enforcement of established 
management measures. RFMQs are arguably the best (albeit not ideal) agents for 
implementation of bottom trawl regulations for the short term. This is primarily 
because they already exist, thus there does not need to be lengthy establishment 
procedures towards new organisations, a process likely to take years. Problems with 
65 See paragraph titled 'A hard or soft law approach?'. 
66 Gjerde above n 37,209. 
67 Kimball above n 3, 274. Such as international obligations to protect biodiversity, consider ecosystem 
impacts and to co-operate to conserve high seas living resources. 
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that can be seen by looking at high seas bottom trawl fisheries that were seriously 
depleted or collapsed before a body could be negotiated to regulate them in spite of 
national measures taken. 68 This was the case in the Southwest Indian Ocean, where 
the orange roughy stocks were depleted in a mere three years. 
A Existing Regulation of Bottom Trawling By RFMOs 
Current regulation of bottom trawling by RFMOs has both advantages and 
disadvantages. On one hand, it shows that some action can and is being taken, despite 
a lack of guiding principles or even consensus over the matter. On the other hand, it 
shows flaws of RFMOs such as their tendency to favour weak regulatory measures. 
A benefit of using RFMO as the tools to implement regulation is that existing 
RFMOs have established systems, processes and components that can be adapted to 
meet changing needs faster than development of new organisations. Some RFMOs 
have already started extending their regulatory powers to cover bottom trawling to 
combat the unsatisfactory situation of having unregulated fisheries on the high seas. 
Full coverage of bottom trawling on the high seas will always be limited by the 
individual capacities of RFMOs. Current lack of regulation may exist because a 
potentially capable RFMO has not looked at bottom trawling or devised management 
procedures around that practice. Alternatively, an area of the high seas may be 
unregulated because the relevant RFMO is based on a species, such as tuna, which is 
not currently taken by bottom trawling.69 Finally, some areas of the high seas will 
remain unregulated if there is simply no RFMO covering that area.70 
A problem hampering current fisheries regulation through RFMOs, which will 
arise also around bottom trawl regulation, is that RFMO measures only apply to 
members and UNFSA parties operating in the area.71 RFMO constituent states may 
68 Kimball above n 3,275; Gjerde above n 37,213. 
69 Kimball above n 3, 274. Kimball gives examples of tuna and salmon as stocks covered by an RFMO 
which does not regulated bottom trawling as they are not caught via this method. 
7° For example Southwest Indian Ocean, Southwest Pacific Ocean, Southeast Pacific Ocean, North and 
Central Pacific, Central Atlantic and Southwest Atlantic Oceans. For further discussion of these, see: 
Deep-sea Conservation Coalition "A net with holes: the regional fisheries management system" 4 
<http://www.greenpeace.org> (last accessed 04 August 2004) . 
71 UNFSA above n 40, art 8; Are K Sydnes "Regional Fisheries Organizations: How and Why 
Organizational Diversity matters" 32 Ocean Development and International Law 349, 352. 
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avoid tough regulations if they can see that these will put them at a disadvantage vis-
a-vis other 'free rider' states who are not bound by similar rules 
Despite these drawbacks, RFMOs are still an important component for driving 
development of bottom trawling regulation. Some of the above areas can be remedied 
through internal development of RFMOs extending their capabilities. Any extension 
is only possible at the will of member states.72 Such development could combat the 
situations where an RFMO could act to regulate bottom trawling, but has not.73 
Currently there are only three RFMOs that are actively regulating bottom trawling 
on the high seas. These are: CCAMLR, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation 
(NAFO), and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). Later is 
discussed the need for concurrent development of international guidelines so as to 
produce consist regulations, however these RFMOs show that action can still be taken 
in the meantime if competence is utilised. Unfortunately, the regulations and actions 
taken have not gone far enough. Nevertheless, a survey of these RFMOs shows us 
the current state of regulation today. 
1 Commission for Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
CCAMLR's unique approach to fisheries management has prompted creation of 
rules to address both the target stocks and their environment. This ecosystem 
approach to conservation and management is revolutionary and is generally 
considered to be best practice within the high seas arena. 74 It recognizes that 
'management of these resources must be expanded to actual biological boundaries as 
72 Sydnes above n 71, 351 notes that although co-operation is being influenced increasingly by 
externalities such as political factors, 'states, as the members of RFO's are the main actors and driving 
forces behind regional fisheries cooperation.' He also observes later (pp 354) that within RFMOs there 
is 'ample room for common and conflicting interests among the members'. 
73 For example the South East Atlantic Fisheries Commission and the Western Pacific Commission 
both have the competence to regulate bottom trawling, but being recently established, have not yet 
done so. 
74 A J Constable; W K de la Mare; DJ Agnew, I Everson, D Miller" Managing fisheries to conserve 
the Antarctic marine ecosystem: practical implementation of the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)" (2000) 57 ICES Journal of Marine Science 778, 789. 
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opposed to arbitrary line not recognised by animal life' .75 This is consistent with the 
definition of the regulatory area (RA), stating that it covers the 'Antarctic marine 
living resources ... which form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem'. 76 This defines 
the scope of the convention by reference to the scope of the ecology of the region. 
CCAMLR's conservation objectives, rather than sustainability for the purposes of 
exploitation, mean that its position among RFMOs is unique. Article 2 (1) tells us 
their objective is 'the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources'. This 
includes prevention of decrease of populations, maintenance of ecological 
relationships and prevention or minimisation of risks of changes in the marine 
ecosystem.77 CCAMLR's precautionary approach pre-dates general use of that term 
and has helped define and shape it.78 Measures that CCAMLR has taken that are 
indicative of this ecological approach are rules to address by-catch and impact on the 
seafloor habitat. 79 
At the present time there are very few bottom trawl fisheries in international 
waters in the CCAMLR region. 80 However, such trawling is only likely to expand as 
a practice due to rapid growth in markets for fish that can be caught through this 
method. For example, bottom trawling may begin to target more heavily the 
patagonian toothfish found around South America and the sub-Antarctic islands. 81 At 
the moment these are taken mainly by long-line fishers. However, Argentine trawlers 
have taken them in their waters, and waters around the Falkland Islands, through 
bottom trawling since the mid-1980's. 82 During late the 1980's frustration expressed 
by the scientific commission of CCAMLR over catch limits signaled a move towards 
a stronger precautionary approach. 83 By the early 1990s, CCAMLR extended this 
precautionary view in recognizing the issue of potentially rapid growth in new and 
75 S Chopra; C Hansen "Deep Ecology and the Antarctic Marine Living Resources: Lessons for Other 
Regimes" (1997) 3 Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 117, 138; also see G Parkes "Precautionary 
fisheries management: the CCAMLR approach" (2000) 24 Marine Policy 83, 83 . 
76 CCAMLR (20 May 1980) 1329 UNTS, 47, art 1. 
77 CCAMLR above n 76, art 2 (1), (3) (a-c) . 
78 Parkes above n 75, 83-84. 
79 Kimball above n 3, 275 . 
8° Kimball above n 3, 275. 
81 DJ Agnew "The illegal and unregulated fishery for toothfish in the Southern Ocean and the 
CCAMLR catch documentation scheme" (2000) 24 Marine Policy 361, 361-2. 
82 Agnew above n 81, 362; Constable above n 81, 782. He notes that the trawling method tends to take 
juvenile fish, while the long lining tends to take more mature fish. 
83 Constable above n 74, 782. 
21 
exploratory fisheries, such as bottom trawling. It came up with a system of controls 
surrounding these that represent current best practice. 
The first was the adoption of the New Fisheries measure in 1991, which is a 
response to previous Antarctic fisheries being initiated without sufficient information 
to adequately regulate them.84 Secondly, the Exploratory Fisheries measure that was 
adopted in 1993; 85 it is 'considerably more prescriptive than the New Fisheries 
measure [and] aims to prevent fisheries from expanding faster than the acquisition of 
information necessary for the development of management advice.' 86 These two 
measures are discussed in more detail under the heading increasing RFMO 
competence. The regulations contained in these two measures will ensure that bottom 
trawling develops in a controlled and observed manner. This regard for precaution 
and the ecology of the intended area means if bottom trawling looks as if is causing 
unacceptable effects, or leading towards unsustainability, CCAMLR has evolved 
processes to deal with it. 
2 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation 
The Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries, (NAFO Convention) has initiated the most regulation around bottom 
trawling, unfortunately most is insufficient to combat its damaging effects. NAFO ' s 
RA comprises the Northwest Atlantic Ocean, reaching out from the upper eastern 
seaboard of the United States, bordering Canada, up to the coast of Greenland. 87 It 
has the dubious distinction of being said to have 'comparatively speaking, the best 
regulated deep water trawl fisheries on the high seas ... [but these] are not without 
84 CCAMLR above n 76, Conservation Measure 31/X, Notification that Members are Considering 
Initiating a New Fishery, preamble <http://www.ccamlr.org> (last accessed 04 August 2005). 
85 CCAMLR above n 76, Conservation Measure 65/XII, Exploratory Fisheries 
<http://www.ccamlr.org> (last accessed 04 August 2005). 
86 Parkes above n 75 , 87. 
87 NAFO Convention (24 October 1978) <http://www.nafo.ca> (last accessed 04 August 2005). Article 
l specifies the area as: North of 35°00' north latitude and west of a line extending due north from 
35°00' north latitude and 42°00' west longitude to 59°00' north latitude, thence due west to 44°00' 
west longitude, and thence due north to the coast of Greenland, and the waters of the Gulf of St 
Lawrence, Davis Strait and Baffin Bay south of 78°00 ' north latitude. 
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significant problems' .88 Bottom trawling is an issue for NAFO, taking virtually all of 
the deep-water species caught in the high seas in this area. The majority of the bottom 
trawl catch consists of redfish, Greenland halibut, and skate. Regulatory measures 
that NAFO has adopted, which affect bottom trawling, include by-catch measures, 
fishing bans, total allowable catch (TAC) quotas. These are set out in a NAFO's 
document titled 'Conservation and Enforcement Measures' this also covers 
enforcement provisions such as vehicle monitoring systems (VMS), and gear 
markings. 
Article 9 of the above document covers the rules surrounding by-catch, which 
basically act to limit the amount of non-target fish can be caught before being in 
breach of NAFO regulations. For example, paragraph 2 states that: 89 
Vessels of a Contracting Party shall limit their by-catch to a maximum of 2 500 kg or 
10%, whichever is the greater, for each species listed in Annex I for which no quota 
has been allocated in that division to that Contracting Party. 
Annex 1 species includes three species that bottom trawling takes. Despite this 
measure, NAFOs' Scientific Committee has expressed concern that by-catch remains 
high, and in same cases is increasing. Additionally, while by-catch regulation could 
provide a means to regulate the effects of bottom trawling on other species, it has 
been used in few areas and primarily 'with respect to other depleted target species.'90 
Finally, by-catch regulations are only focused on other fish stocks and 'there are no 
regulations in place to protect corals or other deep-water habitats from the impact of 
bottom trawling. ' 91 
Other regulatory measures that NAFO has taken include a fishing bans and 
imposition of TACs on some species in certain areas. TACs are more widely used as 
a tool for regulation, but there is a fishing ban on redfish in the '3LN' area. The more 
TAC limits used by NAFO include the intensive 15-year rebuilding plan for 
Greenland halibut. This heavily reduces the TAC over the next few years and is not 
88 Gianni above n 2, 58. 
89 NAFO Convention above n 87, art 9(2). 
90 Kimball above n 3, 275. 
91 Gianni above n 2, 59. 
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subject to increase until 2008 and with the advice of the scientific council.92 NAFO 
has also implemented a TAC as regards some areas of redfish at its latest Annual 
Meeting. Although the Fisheries Commission Working Group looked at options such 
as closures and depth limits, as well as TACs, the latter was decided upon and the 
stock regulated by setting a TAC of 20,000 metric tonnes. 93 Although this, prima 
facie, may be regulation of bottom trawl activity, this quota was actually set in spite 
of the advice of the Scientific Council. Their report noted that 13,000 tonnes had been 
the historic take of redfish since the 1960, and while this level seemed sustainable, 
catches that were above 20,000 tonnes 'would be detrimental to the stock'. 94 This 
shows that NAFO's approach is not precautionary. Internal commitment problems to 
such an approach are highlighted when seeing that setting any quota was opposed by 
some members, including the EU and Ukraine, who felt that there was no need for it 
at that time.95 
This analysis shows that NAFO has developed good options for regulation but 
hasn't implemented any of these in a manner specifically aimed at managing bottom 
trawling or its target species. For example, while NAFO has the ability to use tools 
like gear restrictions it has not done so in a manner relevant to bottom trawling by 
regulating use of deep-sea trawl gear. Another example is that while NAFO has 
developed by-catch regulations, these only apply to other fish, and not the 
relationship between by-catch of non-fish species, such as coral and trawling. For 
NAFO's measures to effectively regulate bottom trawling, they must be more 
specifically directed at that end. 
3 North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission's (NEAFC) has taken some 
regulatory measures directed at bottom trawling, but like NAFOs', these have tended 
92 NAFO/FC Doc. 05/1 <http://www.nafo.ca> (last accessed 25 July 2005) 
93 NAFO Annual Report 2004, Fisheries commission, <http://www.nafo.ca> (last accessed 20 July 
2005) 
94 Report of the Working Group on the Management of 30 Redfish (Redfish Working Group) 30-31 
March 2004 St. John's, NL, Canada, NAFO/FC Doc. 04/2. <http://www.nafo.ca> (last accessed 25 July 
2005) 
95 Redfish Working Group above n 94. 
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to be insufficient. Comprised of the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland, NEAFC's RA 
is roughly 35 degrees north latitude to the Arctic Circle; it is.96 It is an area which has 
exploited deep water bottom trawl fisheries since the 1960's with many states, 
including Russia, Germany, France, Denmark and more recently both Scotland and 
Ireland, participating in this practice.97 The primary focus of the NEAFC convention 
is protection of the fisheries resources, where it 'desir[es] to promote the conservation 
and optimum utilisation of the fishery resources' 98 rather than an ecosystem approach, 
this is consistent with the period in which is was signed. 
NEAFC has taken some regulatory measures around bottom trawling in an 
attempt to limit its impact, and some parties, primarily Norway have been lobbying 
heavily for stronger future regulation, which should also incorporate ecosystem 
considerations. 99 Current regulations include limited area closures of significant 
underwater environments, for example the western slopes of the Rockall Bank, where 
the importance of this feature is evident in its description as 'the cradle of deep-sea 
biology'. 100 However the impetus to do so was not driven by the need to protect the 
ecology, including corals, of the bank, a move recommended by OSPAR, but was 
closed to bottom trawling in an effort to protect the seriously decimated Haddock 
population. 101 Area closures have also been used even though it is said that 'the 
justification for establishing area closures in NEAFC, with the present Convention, 
can be based on fishery considerations alone' 102 thus seeming to preclude area 
closures for the purposes protection of ecosystems. Despite this, NEAFC 
implemented at its 23 rd Annual meeting a measure on Vulnerable Deep-water 
Habitats by Denmark (in Respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Estonia, the 
European Community, Iceland, Norway and Poland, where NEAFC: 103 
96 NEAFC (18 November 1980) 1285 UNTS 129, art l. 
97 Gordon above n 19, 67. 
98 NEAFC Convention above n 98, preamble. 
99 Delegation of Norway above n 22. 
100 Gordon above n 19, 57. 
101 NEAFC Annual Report above n 56, agenda item 13. Also note the 1992 OSPAR Convention is the 
current instrument guiding international cooperation on the protection of the marine environment of 
the North-East Atlantic <http://www.OSPAR.org> (last accessed 25 July 2005) 
102 NEAFC Annual Report above n 56, agenda item 14. 
103 NEAFC "Vulnerable Deep-water Habitats by Denmark (in Respect of the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland), Estonia, the European Community, Iceland, Norway and Poland" 
<http://www.neafc.org/measures> (last accessed 27 June 2005) 
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[R]ecommend[ed] the following interim measure for the protection of vulnerable deep-
water habitats; 
l. Bottom trawling and fishing with static gear shall be prohibited in the following 
areas: 
a) The Hecate and Faraday seamounts, and a section of the Reykjanes Ridge. 
b) The Altair seamounts. 
c) The Antialtair seamounts. 
2. This measure shall be in force for the period l January 2005 - 31 December 2007. 
This acts as a short-term moratorium and by prohibiting the use of 'static gear' (that 
used for bottom trawling) this regulation has the advantage of conserving the marine 
environment. This latter approach is preferable to that of closing areas for fisheries 
purposes alone, as NEAFC has done in the past. Although the effect might be the 
same in that the habitat remains protected, it is not protected for its own sake. Thus 
the intrinsic value of the ecosystem is not recognized, and the protection of the habitat 
remains dependent on the status of the fish stock. Protection of habitat for its own 
sake is a principle reason why regulation of bottom trawling is being advocated for so 
strongly, and deserves consideration in its own right. 
Other regulatory measures that NEAFC has implemented include limits on fleet 
capacity, size, and days at sea, and catch limits on main commercial species. This 
means that bottom trawling simply cannot be done as much, and for as Jong a period, 
this will limit the number of trawls vessels can do and thus reduce both decimation of 
the target stock and their habitats. 
NEAFC has also set up 'Appendix A', which identifies deep-sea species that are 
to be scientifically monitored, with many of the regulations referring back to this. For 
example the EU limits fleet capacity in the convention area for 'full appendix A list 
of species'. 104 This list of species includes species that were previously unregulated 
such as roundnose grenadier, orange roughy, blue ling and deep-sea sharks. 105 The 
TAC regulations around deep-sea species tend to focus on the main commercial 
species of appendix A, and limit the catch level of these deep-water species taken 
104 NEAFC Annual Report above n 56, agenda item 7(f). 
105 Gianni above n 2, 56. 
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from the high seas through bottom trawling within NEAFC's area of jurisdiction.
106 
NEAFC has also instituted an effort cap as regards some species. Named 'the NEAFC 
recommendation for Conservation and Management Measures for Deep Sea Species 
in the NEAFC Regulatory area in 2005', it states that: 107 
Each contracting party undertakes to limit the effort for 2005 put into the directed fishing 
for deep-sea species as set out in Annex l B of the scheme in the NEAFC Regulatory 
Area 
The Effort shall not exceed 70 percent of the highest level put into deep-sea fishing in 
previous years for the relevant species. 
The effort should be calculated as aggregate power, aggregate tonnage, fishing days at 
sea or number of vessels, which participated. 
An effort cap reduces the amount of fishing being done, and will reduce the 
damage to stocks and their environment by reducing the amount of 'effort' put into 
fishing. Overall these regulatory measures look to be fairly comprehensive, but have 
in fact not been particular successful. For example, on closer consideration of this 
measure, the effort cap stipulates that the fishing effort was not to exceed the 'highest 
level put into deep-sea fishing in previous years'. These stocks had been exploited for 
these previous years at a much higher level than they could biologically sustain and 
are so depleted that the cap establishes a limit far higher than the catch levels in 
recent years, meaning that fishing effort could potentially actually expand up to seven 
times what is now and still remain within the limit. 108 Additionally states have entered 
reservations to many of these regulations as regards some species. For example 
Russia, whilst limiting days at sea and fleet size, makes an exception for this in the 
106 NEAFC Annual Report above n 56; Gordon above n 19, 62 notes that out of the seven species 
identified as commercially or potentially commercially important, the specified four were capped. 
Remaining unregulated were greater argentine, black scabbardfish, and blue whiting. 
107 NEAFC "Recommendation III: Recommendation for Conservation and management Measures for 
Deep Sea species in the NEAFC Regulatory area in 2005" <http://www.neafc.org/measures> (last 
accessed 27 June 2005) 
108 Deep-sea Conservation Coalition "A net with holes: the regional fisheries management system" 
above n 70, 3. 
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case of highly affected species such of ling, argentine and Greenland halibut. 109 
NEAFC has not yet instituted any overall gear restrictions or limits on the number of 
trawls, which would aid protection of the marine environment as well as the 
commercially valuable fish stocks. 110 This could be a better method due to NEAFC's 
inability, as stated above, to regulate for effects on habitat and biodiversity. 
Whilst NEAFC has recognised bottom trawling as an area to be dealt with, and 
made some progress towards regulations, they have not yet implanted a truly effective 
regime. This has been recognised within NEAFC and Norway is running a strong 
campaign to get thorough regulations, and establish marine protected areas (MPAs) as 
part of a concentrated effort to regulate bottom trawling. However, this doesn't have 
consistent internal suppmt, with members such as the EU and Iceland backing the 
proposal, and Denmark and Russia stalling such development by 'agreeing in 
principle', but advocating a delay of any action until more information is gathered. 111 
For NEAFC to have adequate regulation, current measures have to be extended or 
expanded upon. The Norwegian delegation at NEAFC's latest Annual Meeting 
identified this need for provision of a more coordinated approach, which can cover 
both sustainability of the stocks and habitat and biodiversity protection. 112 
V SHORT-TERM ACTION 
While there is consensus among many environmentalists, scientists and specialist 
academics that some form of action as regards bottom trawling, this is not echoed by 
consensus towards what for this action should take. For example, proposals range 
from an immediate ban on all trawling, to limited closures of sensitive areas, to 
simply aiming for increased research and information about bottom trawling. Clearly 
such varying approaches for longer-term regulation mean that there is likely to be 
little progress made towards anything. This delay is the basis for a concerted 
109 NEAFC Annual Report above n 56, agenda item 7 (t) . 
110 Deep-sea Conservation Coalition "A net with holes: the regional fisheries management system" 
above n 70, 3. 
111 NEAFC Annual Report above n 56, agenda item 13. 
112 NEAFC Annual Report above n 56, agenda item 14. 
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international effort by conservation groups and scientists to take short-term action 
until movement can be made towards permanent regulation. 
A Proposal for an Interim Moratorium: 
An interim moratorium has been proposed as the logical first step towards 
comprehensive regulation of bottom trawling. For example, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science has collectively drafted and presented a 
statement on the urgent need for a moratorium to the United Nations, which supports 
a UNGA resolution declaring such a moratorium. A moratorium as a short term 
measure is also supported by environmental academics who have concluded that 
'[o]ver the short term, the best option for international action is a UN General 
Assembly declared moratorium or interim prohibition on deep-sea bottom trawling on 
the high seas.' 113 Proposals to the UNGA so far have been fairly weak, for example, 
in its July 2004 Report to the Secretary General, UNICPOLOS proposed that the 
UNGA should: 114 
(a) Urge States, either by themselves or through 
regional fisheries management organisations, where these are competent to do so, to 
consider on a case by- case basis and where justified on a scientific basis, including the 
application of precaution, the interim prohibition of destructive practices by vessels under 
their jurisdiction that have an adverse impact on vulnerable marine ecosystems, including 
seamounts, hydrothermal vents and cold-water corals located beyond national jurisdiction; 
(b) Encourage regional fisheries management organisations with a mandate to regulate 
bottom fisheries to urgently address the impact of deep-sea bottom trawling on vulnerable 
marine ecosystems in accordance with international law; 
(c) Urge members of regional fisheries management organisations without the competence 
to regulate bottom fisheries to expand the mandate, where appropriate, of their 
organisations to cover such activities in accordance with international law. 
113 Gianni above n 2, 78. 
114 Report of the Work on the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans 
and the Law of the Sea at its fifth meeting. A/59/122, paragraphs 6a-c. Full text is available at 
<http://www.un.org> (last accessed 02 August 2005) 
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This falls far short of forming a text to set out the modalities of a moratorium. 
However, the UNGA has supported a more comprehensive approach in principle, 
than that text, in its resolution on Oceans and the Law of the Sea. 115 
Support for a moratorium is not comprehensive, with endorsement of a 
moratorium being blocked by states due to domestic politics. For example consider 
states' actions at the most recent meeting of UNICPOLOS, where, despite having 
produced a fairly weak text, the organisation 'again failed to recommend a 
moratorium on bottom trawling ... Despite support from several countries, the move to 
recommend a global moratorium was blocked by the EU and Iceland.' 116 This shows 
the reluctance of states to make such a bold move, as NEAFC's annual report shows 
us that both these states were in favour of more regulation within that region. 117 This 
may be an indication that states are more willing to regulate through RFMOs, where 
they retain more control over outcomes that will directly impact them. Yet this 
reluctance to take international action echoes the reluctance of states to make strong 
precautionary regulations through RFMOs. In both situations states espouse support 
for ecosystems and precaution in principle, yet produce regulations that are weak or 
ineffective in achieving these outcomes. 118 
A moratorium does not yet have enough support, even as an interim measure to 
become a United Nations General Assembly resolution (UNGAR), it does, however, 
remain an important step towards short term control of bottom trawling. 
B Advantages and Disadvantages of a Moratorium 
Supporters argue that a UNGAR declaring a moratorium would act as a temporary 
stopgap until more knowledge and data about the effects of bottom trawling can be 
accumulated. As a short term measure, environmental groups hope that it will offer 
115 UNGA Resolution 59/24 (17 November 2004) A/RES/59/24 paras 73-76. 
116 UNICPOLOS "Sixth meeting of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea" (6-10 June, New York, 2005) <http://www.fishsec.org> (last accessed 
05 August 2005). 
117 NEAFC Annual Report above n 56, agenda item 14. 
118 For example, NEAFC's effort cap which allows an increase in fishing, and NAFO's TAC limits 
which are set at the outer bounds of sustainability. 
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temporary but earlier protection for threatened ecosystems 119 • It is hoped that a 
moratorium over bottom trawling would create breathing room in which development 
of a more rational and coherent regulatory framework could be established. This 
would avoid current issues such as inconsistent regional approaches taken by RFMOs 
and states as they create their own regulations in a lacuna of uniform international 
standards or principles. Advocates believe that a moratorium will also have 
important longer term benefits in that it would galvanize action at national, regional 
and international levels towards further development. 120 
Proponents of this approach recognize that a UNGAR can be highly effective in 
changing behavior, despite their non-binding nature.121 The oft-cited example of this 
is the successful UNGAR imposed moratorium on large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing 
on the high seas, 122 (hereinafter "high seas drift net fishing") which has 'been as 
effective as any treaty in changing fishing behavior'. 123 This resolution recommends 
the international community institute a moratorium on high seas driftnet fishing by 
1992. The operative parts also state that this moratorium will not be imposed or will 
be lifted 'if effective conservation and management measures could be taken'. 124 
Analogously, it is suggested that the UNGAR based moratorium model may be 
successful for deep sea trawling as well. 
However, while the pelagic drift-net fishing moratorium has been successful, it is 
worth remembering that 'the international community adopts numerous non-binding 
instruments on fisheries every year that seem to have little effect in improving the 
management of fisheries' 125 The pelagic drift-net fishing resolution is considered 
highly successful but it had the advantage of being firmly supported by the USA, who 
119 Deep-sea Conservation Coalition ''The way forward: making a moratorium work" 2 
<http://www.savethehighseas.org> (last accessed 18 August 2004) 
120 Deep-sea Conservation Coalition "The way forward : making a moratorium work" above n 119, 2. 
Although it is accepted that UNGARs do not have a purely legally binding nature per se Johnson 
points out that they they do have moral, political and in some case impose 'quasi legal' duties. D H N 
Johnson ''The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations" (1955-56) 32 
BYIL 97, 101. 
121 See generally B Sloane "The Binding Force of a 'Recommendation' of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations" (1948) 25 BYIL l; and Johnson above n 120, 97-122. 
122 UNGA Resolution 46/215 (20 December 1991) A/RES/46/215 . 
123 David A Balton, Dorothy C Zbicz "Managing Deep-Sea Fisheries: Some Threshold Questions" 
(2004) 19 IJMCL 247,253. 
124 G J Hewison ''The legally Binding Nature of the Moratorium on Large-Scale High Seas Driftnet 
fishing" ( 1994) 25 J Mar L & Com 557, 570. 
125 Balton above n 123, 253. 
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had supported calls for a moratorium since 1989. 126 The USA also implemented 
national limits, and has retained an active role in eliminating usage. A consequence 
of this support has been that many major fishing nations, such as Japan and Taiwan, 
followed suit. 127 Furthermore this resolution took a long time to come into effect, it 
was not rapidly accepted and applied by all. It cannot be expected that a UNGA 
declared moratorium will halt bottom trawling in the short term and provide 
immediate relief. For a UNGA moratorium to have fairly rapid effect there must be 
widespread political will, and preferably support from the stakeholder states. 128 As 
discussed above, it is unlikely that there is the requisite support about this issue yet. 
Because there are important stakeholder states that do not support a moratorium, even 
if such a resolution was passed, these states are unlikely to abide by it. New Zealand, 
while being an industry player does support some form of moratorium but recognizes 
that not all involved states feel the same way. In a September 2004 cabinet 
announcement, New Zealand Ministers Jim Sutton (Acting Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Minister) David Benson Pope (Fisheries Minister) and Chris Carter (Conservation 
Minister) said that whilst they would: 129 
be looking to advance discussions at the United Nations General Assembly . . . to get a 
strong resolution for interim targeted bans on bottom trawling in vulnerable 
areas . .. there did not appear to be broad support for an interim global moratorium on 
high seas bottom trawling, and this was unlikely to form the basis of a proposal at the 
UNGA. 
This suggests that while UNGARs can be highly effective there is not yet 
requisite support within the UNGA to produce a global moratorium analogous to that 
126 Christopher J. Carr; Harry N. Scheiber "Dealing with a Resource Crisis: Regulatory Regimes for 
Managing the World's Marine Fisheries" in UCIAS Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How 
Globalization Affects National Regulato1y Policies (University of California International and Area 
Studies Digital Collection, California, 2002) 18, 19. 
127 Carr above n 126, 18-19. 
128 Sloane above n 121, 32 explains that the influence exerted by recommendations come from the fact 
that they reflect the will of the 'majority of nations and [are] an expression of world opinion'. 
Therefore, to have influence, there must be the requisite international support for the resolution. 
129 Jim Sutton, Acting Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister; David Benson-Pope Fisheries Minister; 
Chris Carter, Conservation Minister "Cabinet decisions on deepwater biodiversity" (24 September 
2004) Press Release <http://www.biodiversity.govt.nz > (last accessed 04 August 2005) 
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on large scale pelagic drift-net fishing on the high seas. 130 A resolution passed 
without the necessary commitment and support will lack the authority that leads to 
effective implementation. 131 Further to this is the view that a non-binding resolution 
would not be enough to prevent these activities and attention should be focused on 
stronger actions instead of a moratorium. 
C Effectiveness of a Moratorium 
These arguments do highlight the reality of problems that a non-binding 
resolution would face. However this does not necessarily mean that the drive for 
such a moratorium is futile. It has been suggested that a UNGAR may still be the best 
step forward in international regulation of deep-seas trawling because 'even a UNGA 
resolution that lacks universal support can make a contribution to enhancing 
awareness and to creating stimulus and legitimacy for further action'. 132 Further to 
this, even if there is not universal support for action to be taken now, 'urgency means 
that a strong resolution with less than universal support may be preferable above a 
weak resolution that enjoys universal support.' 133 These are good arguments in 
favour of continuing to push for a moratorium in spite of a lack of uniform support. 
However it does ignore the point that a strongly worded resolution for a moratorium 
will still not be 'strong' in effect unless it enjoys at least the support of several main 
participants within the industry, and it is unclear whether this is present. The value of 
a UNGAR doesn't necessarily lie in practical effects. As a parallel measure, along 
with development of a more formal regulatory document, such a resolution would 
emphasize the importance of this issue, and the need for further consideration. In this 
way a UNGA declared moratorium would still fulfill an important role as a short term 
measure, even if does not provide immediate protection. 
130 E J Molenaar "Global, Regional and Unilateral Approaches to Unregulated Deep-Sea Fisheries" 
Deep Sea 2003 Conference, 1-5 December 2003, Queenstown, New Zealand, 11. 
131 Molenaar "Global, Regional and Unilateral Approaches to Unregulated Deep-Sea Fisheries" above 
n 131, 11. 
132 E J Molenaar "Unregulated Deep-sea fisheries: a Need for a Multi-Level Approach" (2004) 19 
IJMCL 223, 236. 
133 Molenaar "Unregulated Deep-Sea Fisheries: A Need for a Multi-Level Approach" above n 132, 236. 
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VI PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF LONG TERM MANAGEMENT 
AND REGULATORY GOALS 
In order to get a comprehensive regime covering bottom trawling, there needs to be 
concurrent improvement in RFMO action and development of longer term goals. The 
first aspect of this two-pronged approach requires increased consistency and quality 
of regulations covering bottom trawling; this section will cover this aspect. RFMOs 
are currently in the best position to implement regulations so it is important that they 
take a strong role in increasing regulation of bottom trawl fisheries . It is recognised 
that 'improving both the coverage of RFMOs where there are gaps, and the technical 
competence and performance ... [are] ... critical issues' 134 and must be worked upon if 
these bodies are to become effective vehicles for regulation. To help achieve this, 
there needs to be parallel development of international principles of some kind upon 
which RFMOs can build effective regulations. Options for ways to develop such 
principles are discussed in the paragraph entitled 'development of international 
regulatory guidelines'. 
A The Need/or Better Regulation by Existing RFMOs 
Being at the forefront of fisheries control makes RFMOs the best bodies through 
which to develop bottom trawling regulation. For RFMOs to move regulation forward 
they need to begin to adopt real and effective management measures. This is most 
important for those RFMOs that have already adopted some measures, as they will be 
able to make progress more quickly. Development of new RFMOs remains important, 
but ' [ e ]stablishing RFMOs which could regulate bottom fisheries ... then ensuring that 
all countries involved in deep-water fishing abide by the RFMO's regulations is a 
long term process.' 135 As such the utilisation of existing powers can produce more of 
an RFMO contribution to regulation of deep-sea trawling in the foreseeable future. 
134 Ministry of Fisheries "Report of the FAO Workshop on the Assessment and Management of 
Deepwater Fisheries" (27 - 29 November 2003 Dunedin, New Zealand (Revised 5 December 
< http://www.fish.govt.nz> (last accessed 29 June 2005) 
135 Deep-sea Conservation Coalition "A net with holes: the regional fisheries management system" 
above n 70, 2. 
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The question then becomes; how can RFMOs improve regulation of deep-sea 
trawling within their jurisdiction? Ideally, development of measures should be in line 
with international principles, however these have not yet been established. Other 
regulatory guidelines can be looked at for guidance. We currently have some 
regulatory devices that are representative of sustainable fisheries management, 
reflecting the ecosystem and precautionary principles. These can act as an immediate 
guide, to be adapted and followed by other RFMOs in the dearth of any specific 
international principles. The most sophisticated of such regimes is the CCAMLR 
convention. This regime regulates its fisheries in line with evolving norms of 
management such as the ecosystem and precautionary approaches. 136 This regime is a 
useful tool from which other organisations can draw upon to guide practical 
implementation of these principles. 
B The CCMALR Approach: A Basis for Others? 
The CCAMLR approach represents the most sophisticated conservatory approach 
to sustainable fisheries management. 137 This can benefit RFMOs in two ways. Firstly 
it can act as a guide in the development of new bodies, and secondly it can guide 
development of new regulations by existing RFMOs. As discussed above, this latter 
option is likely to produce tangible effects first. 
Some of CCAMLR's regulatory measures are already common to RFMOs such as 
VMS, inspection and observer programmes, and marking of gear and vehicles. 
CCAMLR has gone further than these and adopted more potent regulations to govern 
all fisheries in their RA. Innovative measures that CCAMLR employs include the 
catch documentation scheme (CDS), which acts as a trade measure to ensure 
legitimacy of catches of endangered fish. 138 CDS requires specific documentation 
validating that they have been caught in accordance with CCAMLR rules before the 
136 Chopra above n 75, 136. 
137 Chopra above n 75, 136-137. For example catch allocation provision are not specified in the 
Convention because the drafter believed this would be contrary to the conservatory nature of 
CCAMLR and change the 'agreement to a pro-fisheries regime'. 
138 Agnew above n 81, 366. 
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port state will allow them to pass. 139 This ensures that the fish are caught with regard 
to CCAMLR's conservation components, as set out in article 2. 140 Applied to bottom 
trawling, such a tool would allow an RFMO to regulate fishing in accordance with its 
conservation principles. If these principles included ecosystem considerations, CDS 
could act to limit damage to both target stock and habitat. 
Two further control measures, adopted under article IX, regulate development of 
fisheries in their jurisdiction; these are the New Fisheries Measure and the 
Exploratory Fisheries Measure. These are particularly relevant to the expanding 
practice of bottom trawling. These measures grant CCAMLR control of present 
fisheries, but also control of the development of future fisheries, of which bottom 
trawl fisheries will be a component. These regulations will regulate bottom trawl 
fisheries in accordance with CCAMLR's principles. 
The 1991 New Fisheries measure specifies that 'no fishing activity on a species in 
a management area, using a particular gear type, which has not been fished before, 
can proceed without prior notification to the Commission' .141 The commission must 
also be notified at least 3 months in advance of its next meeting of any such proposal. 
This means that if the commission objected to the fishing measure, whilst not having 
any formal rejection criteria, could theoretically adopt a specific conservation 
measure that could have the effect of shutting down the proposed fishery. Although 
this is deemed as 'unlikely to happen' due to the requirement of consensus around 
such a decision, it does provide advance notification of any action to members. 142 
Any proposal must also include data such as the nature of the proposed fishery on 
which the council can then comment. Required data includes; information about the 
target species; region of fishing; minimum level of catch required to develop a viable 
fishery; comprehensive biological data (such as abundance of stock); details of 
dependent and associated species and the likelihood of affects on these if the 
proposed fishery goes ahead. 143 
139 See Agnew above n 81, 365-368 for a more detailed description of the modalities of this system. 
14° CCAMLR above n 76, art 2. Also see Parkes above n 75, 85 for general format that CCAMLR has 
afiplied for conservation measures. 
1 1 Parkes above n 75, 86. 
142 Parkes above n 75, 86. 
143 CCAMLR above n 76, "Notification that Members are Considering Initiating a New Fishery" 
Conservation Measure 31/X, art 3 (i-iii). 
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Further to the instigation of new and exploratory fisheries, CCAMLR realized that 
they would also have to regulate the development of these once they got underway. 
This resulted in production and adoption of the comprehensive Exploratory Fisheries 
measure in 1993. 144 This measure aims to ensure that new fisheries do not develop 
faster than the accumulation of scientific information about their effects. 145 In the 
case of bottom trawling this is highly relevant as it could prevent destruction of 
vulnerable areas where their importance is still unknown. 
The 1997 meeting of the parties produced further fisheries regulation, and 
additional conservation measures for new fisheries were agreed upon. These included 
precautionary catch limits, season length and effort limitations, the requirement to 
carry CCAMLR designated scientific observers and satellite monitoring systems, and 
finally the requirement of comprehensive data collection schemes to monitor 
progress. 146 
C Problems Still Faced by RFMOs 
The CCAMLR approach is not a panacea to all problems faced by RFMOs. 
While the adoption of similar regulations would go a long way towards improvement 
of bottom trawling on the high seas, it does not deal with other issues. For example, 
there is the issue of whether CCAMLR's approach can be successfully applied within 
other RFMO RAs. Secondly, even if the CCAMLR approach is broadly applicable, 
RFMOs must still combat institutional problems such as IUU fishing, non-contracting 
parties, and enforcement of regulations. 
1 Is CCAMLR's approach broadly applicable ? 
Development of CCAMLR's distinctive regulatory system has been influenced by 
both political and geographical factors . The issue is whether these factors are 
preventative of it's regulations being used elsewhere. While these factors have 
144 CCAMLR above n 76, "Exploratory Fisheries" Conservation Measure 65/XII. 
145 Constable above n 74, 785 . 
146 Parkes above n 75, 87. 
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contributed to development of unique regulation, their presence 1s not vital to 
successful implementation. 
Politically, CCAMLR was negotiated with different ends in mind than other 
RFMOs, with its principles founded in 'rational use of marine species while ensuring 
principles of conservation'. 147 Its conservation principles (found in article 3) are wide 
ranging and form a basis of complete ecosystem management. By comparison, the 
original aims of NEAFC and NAFO are based solely on the optimum utilisation of 
their fisheries resources. 
CCAMLR was also adopted under article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, and so forms 
part of the Antarctic Treaty System (A TS). 148 This group of conventions and treaties 
either have, or have been interpreted as having, a strong conversationalist approach to 
the Antarctic area. As such it would be inconsistent for CCAMLR's approach to be 
any different if it is to contribute to the same system. For example, other treaties that 
make up the ATS include treaties governing protection of marine mammals such as 
whales and fur seals. 149 
CCAMLR's geographical position has also influenced the development of 
regulations. CCAMLR's RA has the benefit of being 'clearly delimited by the 
Antarctic Convergence [which] acts as an effective biological barrier ... the Southern 
Ocean is therefore substantially a closed ecosystem.' 150 Other RFMO regulatory 
areas do not have the benefits of such a closed ecosystem, and have to struggle with 
issues such as straddling stocks. In that situation, half the stock may be within their 
RA, but the other outside of their jurisdiction. This may provide less incentive to 
initiate conservatory regulations around the stock, as states do not want to deny 
themselves access to stocks if another is going to come and fish it anyway. 
While these factors have undoubtedly facilitated CCAMLR's ability to create 
these regulations, they are not necessarily vital to their effectiveness. Although 
147 Constable above n 74, 779. 
148 Constable above n 74, 779. 
149 Constable above n 74, 779. The ATS was designed to manage the use of Antarctic marine living 
resources whose populations had been taken to the point of extinction. To this end it focused on the 
key prey species of krill. This focus was necessary as there needed to be management of krill fisheries 
'to ensure that exploitation of krill did not inhibit the recovery of whale and seal populations' which 
rely heavily on it as a food source. 
150 General Introduction <http://www.ccamlr.org> (last accessed 28 July 05). 
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CCAMLR adopted the ecosystem approach first, it has now been recognised by other 
RFMOs. It is up to them whether they chose to implement a similar approach or not. 
Successful adaptation and introduction of CCAMLR-type regulation is more likely to 
be dependant on the commitment of the RFMO to making them work, rather than the 
historical development of the regulatory measure itself. As such, while CCAMLR's 
unique position was vital to developing such regulations, it is not likely to be a bar to 
their effective transfer to another area. 
2 Institutional problems faced by RFMOs 
RFMOs including CCMLR still have to battle other, more general problems to 
ensure effective operation. These include problems of funding, non-contracting 
parties (NCPs), state control over enforcement, and consensus dominated decision 
making often leading to weak regulations. 151 
Lack of adequate funding means that regulations cannot be monitored or enforced, 
either against their party states or NCPs. CCAMLR is an example of an RFMO that 
has a thorough management system, 152 but insufficient funds to ensure enforcement. 
The result is that this region continues to be plagued by IUU fishing, undermining the 
effective operation of regulations. As with all fisheries, bottom trawling regulations 
will not be effective unless they are enforced. Without sufficient funding for 
monitoring and enforcement, a regulated area could potentially could end up as 
damaged as an unregulated one. 
NCPs present a problem for all RFMOs, being beyond the scope of either general 
UNFSA, or specific RFMO measures. They have 'posed some of the major 
constraints for effective fisheries management' as regulations made by an RFMO 
cannot affect the behavior of NCPs. 153 NCPs are free to apply the customary law of 
UNCLOS, which grants freedom of fishing on the high seas. Despite RFMOs being 
151 Ronald Barston "The Law of the Sea and Regional Fisheries Organisations" (1999)14 IJMCL 333, 
347. 
152 As outlined by Parkes above n 75, 83-84. 
153 Barston above n 151, 351. 
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able to impose limited trade bans over NCPs, 154 it is considered that 'the lack of 
control over non-member state fleets is an enormous loophole in the regional fisheries 
management scheme.' 155 NCPs may also influence the adoption of regulations by an 
RFMO. For example, a member may lobby against adoption of precautionary bottom 
trawling regulations as they foresee that ship-owners will switch registration to an 
'open-registry' state. In doing this, that vessel becomes free of any conservatory 
measures put in place by the RFM0.156 
Finally there is the problem of the dominant sovereign power of the state vis-a-vis 
the RFMO as a body. Barston points out that a state may 'prefer to remain outside 
.. .institutions for the fear of loss of access to ... resources and quota limitations 
imposed on them.' 157 However, even if a state does become a member, it retains the 
power to make reservations to any regulation of that RFMO. This ability is frequently 
exercised, for example, both Demark and Russia have entered reservations as regards 
NEAFC bottom trawl regulation. Additionally enforcement of regulations is left to 
member countries, and so the effectiveness of the RFMO measure is 'entirely 
dependent on the good faith efforts of their member states'. 158 If a state does not wish 
to take a hard-line against its ships fishing in contravention of a measure, little can be 
done to effect compliance. 
D Overview of the Role of RFMOs in Bottom Trawling Regulation 
This discussion and overview of RFMOs sets out four steps of the argument 
towards bottom trawling regulation. Firstly, some RFMOs can and are regulating 
bottom trawling albeit to with differing levels of success. Their current position 
154 Barston above n 151, 352. Trade measures such as refusing port access and trade sanctions to 
dissuade NCPs have been applied by the United States. Other states such as Brazil , Japan and France 
have raised doubts about their legitimacy under the World Trade Organisation. 
155 Deep-sea Conservation Coalition "A net with holes: the regional fisheries management system" 
above n 70, 3. 
156 Barston above n 151, 339 notes that the FAO Code of Compliance attempts to limit this with article 
VI provisions. These envision a comprehensive vessel monitoring system monitored by means national 
databases which hold information about all fishing vessels. This information, such as a vessel having 
its license revoked should then be circulated among members. 
157 Barston above n 151,349. 
158 Deep-sea Conservation Coalition "A net with holes: the regional fisheries management system" 
above n 70, 3. 
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within fisheries management means that developing these abilities is a logical way to 
achieve timely regulation of bottom trawling, both as it exists and as it expands. 
Although development of new RFMOs which can regulate this area is important, it is 
an extremely long term goal and cannot be relied upon to resolve issues as they are 
happening now. Secondly, regulation being produced needs to be more effective it is 
to produce tangible results. The CCAMLR approach is illustrative of how the 
precautionary and ecosystem approaches can be incorporated into RFMO regulations. 
Other RFMOs could adapt CCAMLR's tools in order to achieve stronger regulation 
of bottom trawling in their area. It is recognised that even if stronger regulations are 
developed, they cannot address all of the problems faced by RFMOs, such as funding 
issues. This does not mean that RFMOs cannot still be effective and highly useful 
bodies through which to develop controls around bottom trawling. However, these 
limitations do support the need for additional development of regulation. A 
suggestion here is that RFMO action should be supported by international action, for 
example the production of a set of guidelines to cover acceptable bottom trawling 
practices. 
The debate around this issue is what form these guidelines should take, for 
example would a soft or hard law method be better? Should there be use of existing 
agreements or development of a new one? There is no clear consensus as to the right 
answer, with each presenting its own advantages and disadvantages. 
VII DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY GUIDELINES 
A A Hard or Soft Law Approach? 
Guidelines supplemental to RFMO action could be pursued through means of 
hard or soft law. The debate around which would be more effective was an issue 
faced during the negotiation of the UNFSA, where both methodologies presented pros 
and cons. 159 Arguments advanced were typical of the generic debate that surrounds 
the use of these. For example, the minority (comprised mainly of the distant water 
159 Balton above n 123, 252. 
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fishing nations (DWFNs)) pointed out that soft law can be highly effective in 
changing behavior, whilst not requiring the intense drawn out negotiations that would 
inevitably come from drafting a binding treaty. 160 The majority however felt that 
'only a binding instrument would command the respect and induce changes in fishing 
practices' .161 
A basic matrix can show the main trade-offs between the two approaches: 162 
Hard law 
Advantages Creates legally binding 
obligations on parties, modem 
treaties usually also include 
compliance and enforcement 
measures to encourage 
achievement of its aims. As 
treaties require express consent, 
they reflect true willingness to 
proceed. Treaties are seen as the 
most important source of 
international law. 
Disadvantages Can constitute the lowest 
common denominator. Can take 
long time to negotiate. There 
may be a significant lag time 
between conclusion of 
negotiation and entry into force. 
It will still only bind parties who 
sign it. 
160 Balton above n 123, 252. 
161 Balton above n 123, 252. 
Soft law 
Can contain more detail about 
what is to be done, and be less 
reflective of the weakest, least 
controversial views. Can be 
negotiated faster than hard law 
as states are less worried about 
signing a non-binding 
agreement. Success will reflect 
the political will. Can signal 
development of an issue which 
later becomes hard law. 
As it is not legally binding it will 
be ignored if there is not the 
political will at the international 
and national level to mobilize it. 
Compliance relies on whether 
parties intended to create 
binding rules and relationships. 
162 See generally: A E Boyle "Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law" (1999) 
48 ICLQ 901, particularly 902-903; CM Chinkin "The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and 
Change in International Law" (1989) 38 ICLQ 850; Shaw, International Law (5ed, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) Chapter 3; Cassese International Law (2ed Oxford University Press, 2005) 
Part III. 
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Development of regulatory guidelines to cover bottom trawling is likely cause 
similar dissent and produce similar arguments among stakeholders. 163 Neither can be 
said to be a better approach in all circumstances than the other, as there are examples 
of both that have affected fishing practices. For example hard law measures that have 
changed fisheries management include the UNFSA in 1995, and the FAQ Code of 
Compliance adopted in 1993, and of course the RFMO establishing conventions. 164 
On the other hand, soft law instruments that have also contributed to charges are: the 
UNGAR instituting a moratorium on the use of large-scale pelagic driftnets, the FAQ 
Code of Conduct, and the four international points of action (IPOAs) adopted by the 
FA0.16s 
B Amendment vs. Development 
1 Amendment 
There is further debate about whether guidelines, either hard or soft, should be 
created anew or extrapolated from existing agreements. There is academic support for 
both sides of this debate, for example, there is the argument that: 166 
The inescapable conclusion is that we already have to tools to deal with these problems 
in the 1995 Agreement and the FAO code of conduct and the various [International 
Plans Of Action] adopted by FAQ. What is needed now is for words to be translated 
into action. This requires political commitment and action at national, regional and 
global levels. 
163 Chinkin above n 162, 851-852 notes that there is the additional factor that treaties and soft law 
instruments are highly variable and not easy to classify as one or the other. For example there can be 
soft law obligations included in treaties, and codes of conduct that have been accepted as binding by 
the international community, thus blurring the lines between what is hard law and what is soft law. 
164 Balton above n 123, 248-249. Also note that although the FAQ Code of Compliance is binding it is 
considered to be part of the non-binding FAQ Code of Conduct. 
165 Balton above n 123, 249. These deal with IUU fishing, by-catch of seabirds, fishing capacity and 
sharks. 
166 Lodge above n 4, 304. 
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On the other hand, it is posited that 'despite great advances in the global regime 
on fisheries ... existing legal instruments are not adequate in dealing effectively with 
current challenges to the management of deep-sea fisheries.' 167 
Both these options have been debated at an international level. New Zealand's 
Ministry of Fisheries reported that options debated at an international level included 
the amendment of existing multi-lateral agreements, for example the UNFSA and 
FAO compliance agreement, and the need for an additional agreement, to 
complement a moratorium. 168 There is not yet any firm agreement on what path 
should be taken, or indeed if either will be taken. However, both options present 
valid reasons why it could be more effective than the other. 
None of the above options present a clearly superior means through which to 
pursue development of international principles. It has been suggested that 
amendment of the UNFSA would perhaps form the best basis, as it potentially already 
does cover some deep-sea stocks (as discussed above). However this ignores some 
critical problems that will have to be overcome before it could have the desired 
effects. For example, there would still need to be amendment of the UNFSA to ensure 
that all relevant stocks are covered. Such significant changes are not common to 
international treaties, in fact they are highly unlikely. Even if there were enough 
support to make these changes within the UNFSA, those members who engaged in 
bottom trawling would still have to agree to be bound by the amendments. It is basic 
treaty law that these states will not be without their consent. They could therefore 
reserve their positions as to any amendment and keep applying the UNFSA in its 
current form. Additionally, although ratifications to the UNFSA are slowly 
increasing, it is still not widely ratified. Any amendment to it may jeopardize further 
ratification to the original agreement and prevent that from becoming implemented 
more widely. As such, the UNFSA may not be the best document through which to 
try to produce generally applicable international principles. 
167 Moritaka Hiyashi "Global Governance of Deep-Sea Fisheries" (2004) 19 IJMCL 289,289. 
168 Ministry of Fisheries "Report of the FAO Workshop on the Assessment and Management of 
Deepwater Fisheries" above n 134. 
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2 Development 
There is some support for the negotiation and development of a new international 
agreement. For example, at the 2005 meeting of the FAO Conference on Fisheries 
(COFI) it was suggested that the: 169 
FAO should urgently develop technical guidelines under the Code of Conduct relating 
specifically to conservation and management measures for deep sea fish stocks, and 
that existing RFMOs be used to regulate deep sea fisheries on the high seas. 
The UNFSA could provide guiding principles directed at bottom trawling. Although 
the conference noted that 'states should apply the fundamental management 
principles of UNFA to fish stocks found exclusively in the high seas (i.e., discrete 
high seas stocks)' that this should be achieved through 'developing a legal instrument 
based on this commitment.' 170 
Like the UNFSA, the purpose of guidelines would be to elaborate on UNCLOS 
conservation concepts, but would specifically cover existing and potentially 
exploitable discrete high seas stocks. 171 To aim to develop regulation through this 
means is a huge undertaking likely to take many years, even if there is enough 
support to launch negotiations. And, finally, if there is enough support, and if a treaty 
is produced, the end result is still not one of guaranteed effectiveness. Obstacles such 
as enforcement, compliance, funding and non-participation would have to be faced if 
the treaty were to provide useful guidelines. Further to the last point, Hiyashi believes 
that for an enforcement regime to be effective it would have to cover states which 
have not joined RFMOs. Also ' [m]ore specifically, there is a need to provide 
sufficient legal basis to compel unwilling fishing states to join in specific 
collaborative efforts or to enforce conservation measures of existing RFMOs.' 172 
At the moment such a development is more an academic ideal rather than a likely 
prospect. Currently there is not even enough support for a non-binding UNGA 
169 COFI above n 52, 13. 
17° COFI above n 52, 19. [my emphasis]. 
171 Hiyashi above n 167,296. 
172 Gjerde above n 37,220; Hiyashi above n 167,296. 
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instated moratorium on bottom trawling, or agreement on how, if at all, regulation 
should proceed. It is highly improbable that the international community would be 
able to negotiate an entire agreement on bottom trawling in the present atmosphere. 
C The Way Forward 
There are significant problems faced in attempting to amend an existing 
agreement, and negotiating hard law. As such, the best approach for bottom trawling 
regulation may be to aim for a soft law declaration, which has a better chance of 
materializing, even if this means compromising on other aspects. Along with the 
drive for an interim moratorium, support for regulation around bottom trawling can 
be used to sponsor negotiations towards a soft law declaration setting out the guiding 
principles. Despite a soft law document suffering from the weaknesses outlined above, 
its benefits would be considerable. A soft law declaration will benefit from increased 
participation in the negotiation process and ability to produce provisions that are more 
detailed and thorough than provision of a hard law declaration. 173 
Although a soft law document may not be able to legally enforce changes in 
behavior, it is hoped that it would act to lead to such changes. Firstly, a soft law 
declaration of principles 'can help generate widespread and consistent state practice' 
by marshalling a 'consistent general response on the part of states' .174 In doing this it 
becomes evidence of an emerging customary rule, which would then be binding in its 
own right. A soft law instrument could also be used as the first step in achieving a 
later treaty. 175 This treaty, being based on previously decided terms, could contain a 
more comprehensive regime than if such an agreement had been attempted as the first 
step. However, even standing alone, many environmental declarations have achieved 
some effectiveness as soft law documents. 176 Their success lying more in the political 
commitment to achieving principles than whether states are legally bound by it. 177 In 
the latter case it is unlikely that states would choose to be bound unless the political 
173 Boyle above n 162, 903. 
174 Boyle above n 162, 903-904. 
175 Boyle above n 162, 904. 
176 Shaw above n 162, 111; Boyle above n 162, 904. 
177 Shaw above n 162, 111. 
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commitment was already present, in which case soft law would offer more 
advantages as it can produce stronger regulations. 
The final point that remains is what bottom trawling guidelines should cover. This 
will of course be a compromise between comprehensive protection, and what states 
would actually agree on (even in soft law form). At a minimum, a declaration of 
international principles to guide bottom trawling would have to cover extensive 
information gathering and sharing requirements, so as to obtain better knowledge 
about actual sizes and sustainable harvesting levels of stocks. Management should be 
instituted on a precautionary, CCAMLR style basis, which covers existing and 
potential fisheries. It is vital that these guidelines cover protection of the marine 
environment, and deal with the broader challenge of deep-sea biodiversity and 
interrelationships of fish stocks and their habitat. Further issues that could be included 
are guidelines around bio-discovery and prospecting and equitable benefit sharing of 
deep-sea resources, both fishery and otherwise. 178 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Bottom trawling is an example of how the advent of new technology can change the 
balance between utilisation and conservation of fisheries resources. A major issue 
with this practice is that due to its recent emergence its effects are still relatively 
unknown. While there is evidence that it affects target stocks and their habitats, it is 
unclear what the result of this could be. However, many scientists believe that these 
newly discovered habitats are intrinsically valuable. As such, their protection alone 
should be reason enough to impose stronger regulations on bottom trawling. Industry 
players deny the need for this, arguing that not all targeted areas are so worthy of 
protection that it can justify prohibiting their actions. Additionally, it is not accepted 
by everyone that bottom trawling even causes damage per se. 
This is the contentious climate in which advocates of regulation are attempting to 
make the progress they see as necessary. Analysis of current regulation by RFMOs is 
considered to be generally insufficient to achieve real conservatory effects. The 
178 Kimball above n 3, 284. 
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Exception is the is CCAMLR regime, which if applied as intended has the ability to 
impact on how bottom trawling is carried out. As such, it is recommended as a basis 
for further regulation by other RFMOs. RFMOs remain the best bodies through 
which to implement regulation. This is because they have the ability to act 
immediately, as opposed to the long term option of developing new bodies through 
which to drive regulation. Faults are recognised with RFMOs that can inhibit truly 
effective implementation of regulations. However, these faults are common to all 
areas of fisheries that RFMOs manage, and lack of perfection is not considered a 
valid reason for inertia. Success, even in a limited way, of RFMO instated regulation 
to cover bottom trawling will rely heavily on the political commitment of their 
member states. This will require a sentiment in favour of regulation within the 
international community. At the moment the impetus to generate such a sentiment is 
being focused on achieving a UNGA declared moratorium. It is hoped this would 
provide some temporary relief while longer-term options for regulation are discussed. 
While a moratorium will not lead to an immediate or absolute cessation of bottom 
trawling, it is hoped that over time it will take effect, as has been the case for other 
similar measures. However, a moratorium is by definition only temporary. For this 
reason it is suggested that alongside a push for an interim moratorium, there should 
be moves made towards development of international guidelines or principles that 
regulate and govern bottom trawling. Although this could be pursued through hard or 
soft law, the latter offers a more practical and probable means through which to 
achieve the guidelines. 
There is no paradigm for how effective management of fisheries should be 
developed or applied in the shifting kaleidoscope of international marine governance. 
What is certain is that some action must be taken, and soon, if yet another fishery is to 
be prevented from over exploitation . 
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